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Abstract
The recent developments in wireless communication technologies along with the
plummeting costs of hardware allow both V2V and V2I communications for
information exchange. Such a network is called Vehicular ad Hoc Network
(VANET) which is very important for various road safety and non-safety related
applications. However, Due to the wireless nature of communication in VANETs,
it is also prone to various security attacks which are originally present in wireless
networks. Hence to realize the highest potential of VANET, the network should
be free from attackers, there by all the information exchanged in the network must
be reliable i.e. should be originated from authenticated source.
However, authentication of vehicles using a PKI based architecture which is
mostly based on V2I communication and solely depends on Road side Units, might
fail in case of absence of proper infrastructure. Moreover PKI based solutions
incur more communication overhead due to repeated connections with the Trusted
Authority every time you want to authenticate a vehicle.
Hence, this thesis work gives an OBU based authentication mechanism which
allows the vehicle to authenticate each other for V2V communication when there
is lack of proper infrastructure. Here each vehicle is capable of generating a
pair of self-certified public/private key pair which can be verified by any other
vehicle using a predefined secret key given by Trusted Authority. The grouping
concept used in order to lower the communication overheads. The Vehicle in
close proximity of each other form a group and select a group leader, who is then
responsible for generating a group public and private key pair for communication
with group leader. A vehicle can obtain the group key by authenticating itself to
the group leader.
Our proposed scheme also preserves the privacy of the vehicle but can reveal
the identity in liability issues. The security analysis of the proposed scheme
shows that it can indeed operate with limited support of infrastructure and can
become a fully self-organized system.
Keywords: VANET, V2V communications, security, authentication, vehicular communication
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Introduction
The vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a kind of wireless ad hoc network
which deploys the concept of continuous varying vehicular motion. Here, the
moving vehicles act as nodes. It is an active area research right now and
emerging type of network aimed at improving safe driving, traffic optimization
and some other services through vehicle to infrastructure communication (V2I) or
vehicle to vehicle communication (V2V). It plays an important part in intelligent
transportation system (ITS) [18] which is described in section1.1.1 Each vehicle
communicate send and receive messages by On Board Unit (OBU) and equipped
with Event Data Recorder, GPS, Trusted component etc. The Roadside Units
(RSU) are responsible for broadcasting safety messages periodically.
With recent advances in the development of Wireless communications protocols
and plummeting costs of hardware needed, along with the automobile industrys
desire to increase road safety and gain competitive edge in the market , Vehicles
are equipped with latest communication hardwares, GPS etc. hence becoming
Computers on Wheels or computers networks on wheels [1]
But wireless communication is itself susceptible to various attacks, hence the
security of VANET cannot be undermined. Some malicious vehicle may send
false information into the network to gain unfair advantage on the road or to
cause serious accidents. Hence the sender vehicles should be authenticated by the
receiver before taking any action based on the received safety message. Normally
origin authentication is provided by digital signature with the help of certification
services. In VANET, a Trusted Authority (TA) serves the purpose, but it involves
huge communication over-head and also a vehicle have to communicated with TA
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via RSUs. Now RSUs are fixed infrastructures along the road, which periodically
broadcast safety related information, Typically RSUs placed over every 300m to 1
km and they broadcast at the interval of every 300ms. Hence placing RSUs along a
long highway to provide omnipresent infrastructure is not feasible economically for
now. Hence vehicle should be able to authenticate others with limited help from
TA or fixed infrastructure. Also in VPKI, the public keys are bound to identity of
the vehicles in certificates, hence an eavesdropper may track the sending vehicle,
but we need to protect the privacy as well.
Hence in our research, we propose an OBU based authentication scheme for
V2V communication, where the vehicles generate self-certified public/private key
pairs with the help of a check value computed by TA and initially given to Vehicles
during registration. The Check value is computed via one way hash chaining
mechanism. The same check value is given to multiple vehicles in order to achieve
privacy. But a tracking hint is attached to all the sent messages by default, which
can later be used to identify a vehicle. Also group formation is done, so that all
the vehicles send their messages to Group leader, then the Group leader sends the
aggregated message to all for reducing communication overhead. Our research is
solely focused on authentication of vehicles, hence it is possible that an legitimate
vehicle of the network i.e. authenticated vehicle may send false information with
malicious intent. Hence in that case, reliability of messages comes into scene,
which is beyond the scope of our research. But We assume that vehicle do evaluate
reliability of messages using existing optimal schemes, which can later be used for
revocation purpose.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The introduction of VANET, its
overview, various security aspects are given in Section 1. Some existing methods in
literature are discussed in Section 2. The proposed scheme and its various aspects
are given in section 3. In section4, we analyze the performance and security aspects
of our proposed scheme.Finally Section 5 concludes the thesis.
1.1 VANET Overview
1.1.1 Intelligent Transportation System
In ITS, each vehicle acts as sender, receiver and router to broadcast the
information to the vehicular network or transportation agency, which then used
2
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the information to ensure safe, free-flow of traffic. The vehicles must be configured
with On Board Units (OBU), and the Road Side Units (RSU) must be present
at fixed intervals for communication to occur. RSUs are connected to the
backbone network which is assumed to be secure and free from security attacks.
RSUs and Trusted Authority (TA) are static in nature and together forms the
fixed infrastructure. The number and distribution of RSUs depends on the
communication protocol to be used. The possible configurations in ITS are vehicle
to vehicle, vehicle to infrastructure and routing based communications [3] the
following figure 1.1 depicts a typical ITS.
Figure 1.1: Intelligent Transportation System
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1.1.2 Vehicle to Vehicle Communication
It is multi-hop multicast/broadcast communication used to transmit traffic related
information over multiple hops to a group of receivers. ITS is generally concerned
with the road ahead and not on the road behind. ITS mainly used two types of
message forwarding techniques, Nave Broadcasting and Intelligent Broadcasting
[3].
• Naive Broadcasting : believes in periodic broadcasting of messages at regular
intervals. If the message comes from behind then the vehicle ignores the
message, but if the message comes from a vehicle ahead then the receiving
vehicle send its own broadcast message to the vehicles behind it. The
limitations of naive broadcasting method is that large numbers of broadcast
messages are generated, hence increases network overhead.
• Intelligent Broadcasting : overcomes the above limitation by using
acknowledgements, hence limiting the number of message broadcasts. If the
event-detecting vehicle receives the same message from behind it, it assumes
that at least one vehicle in the back has received it and will be responsible
for further transmitting the message. Hence it ceases broadcasting.In our
research, we are mostly focusing on V2V communication only.
1.1.3 Vehicle to Infrastructure Communication
Also known as V2I communication. here the Road Side Unit (RSU) broadcasts
message to the vehicles in the vicinity. This type of configuration provides ample
amount of bandwidth link between communicating parties. Mostly used for traffic
optimization messages.
1.1.4 Routing Based Communication
Its a multi-hop unicast method where a message is transmitted in a multi-hop
fashion until it reaches the desired vehicle. It is combination of both V2V and V2I
communication. Mostly used for both safety and non-safety message transmission,
infotainment services etc.
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1.2 Distinguished Features of VANET
Vehicular ad hoc Network (VANET) is a unique kind of MANET where the nodes
are mobile vehicles. The similarity between these two networks is characterized
by the movement and self organization of nodes. But the main difference between
VANET and MANET is, the nodes move in random but predictable manner but
at much higher speeds in VANET. The nodes in VANET possess substantial power
resources, which is an advantage over traditional ad hoc networks.
VANET can be distinguished from other ad-hoc networks by the following
properties:
• Highly Dynamic Topology :The topology of VANET is always changing due
to high speed of movement of vehicles.
• Sporadic Network Connectivity : Due to the same high speed movement of
vehicles, the connectivity of the VANET changes frequently. The network is
sparsely connected, when the vehicle density is low.
• Geographic type of Communication : The VANETs mostly used
geographical broadcasting aimed at a particular geographic region. The
Rode Side Units (RSU) often broadcast various traffic optimizatior, safety
related application which will be received by the vehicles currently residing
in their coverage area.
• Mobility Modeling and Prediction :It plays an important role for designing
the protocols for VANET. In VANET, the movement of vehicles are
constrained by highways, street roads which can’t be changed. Hence given
the map of current geographic location and approximate speed of vehicle,
the position of vehicle in the future can be determined.
• Hard Delay Constraints : In life threating accidents or situations, where
the emergency safety message (ESM) should reach other vehicles as soon as
possible, there should not be slightest delay or network interruption.
• Sufficient Energy and Storage : The nodes (vehicles) have ample energy and
computing power (including both storage and processing).
• Different Communication Environments : Relatively simple highway traffic
scenarios and complex city traffic scenarios.
5
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1.3 Applications of VANET
The main applications of VANET are categorized into following two categories.
They are as follows:
• Safety related applications: such as co-operative lane merging and collision
avoidance. This kind of applications deals with life-threating conditions
where the existence of a service may prevent life-endangering accidents.
• Non-safety related applications : such as traffic optimization, electronic toll
collection, congestion pricing system, infotainment services.
1.4 Communication Standards for VANET
1.4.1 Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
It is developed by USA and is a short to medium range communications service
that is used for V2I and V2V communication. The United states Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had allocated 750 MHz of spectrum i.e from
8.5 GHz to 9.25 GHz to be used by DSRC. [8]. DSRC spectrum has 7 channels
with each channel 100 Mhz wide. Out of 7 channels, six channels are used for
service purpose and remaining one for control purpose. The following figure 1.2
shows the bandwidth allocation of DSRC Spectrum.
Figure 1.2: DSRC Bandwidth Allocation [8]
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1.4.2 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE)
(IEEE 1609.11p)
In 2003, American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) sets ASTM-DSRC
which was totally based on 802.11 MAC layer and IEEE 802.11a physical layer [8].
The main problem with IEEE 802.11a with Data Rate of 54 Mbps is it suffers
from multiple overheads. Vehicular scenarios demands high speed data transfer
and fast communication because of its high topological change and high mobility.
For this the DSRC is renamed to IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access in vehicular
Environments (WAVE) by the ASTM 2313 working group. This works on MAC
layer and physical layers. WAVE consists of Road Side Unit (RSU) and On-Board
Unit (OBU). WAVE uses OFDM technique to split the signals. The following
figure 1.3shows the WAVE, IEEE 802.11p, IEEE 1609 and OSI model.
Figure 1.3: WAVE protocol Stack [8]
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1.5 Components Needed for VANET Security
Architecture
1.5.1 Event Data Recorder (EDR)
Similar to black-box in areoplanes and responsible for storing the vehicles critical
data, such as position, speed, time, received messages etc. during emergency
events [14], which will help in crash reconstruction and the attribution of liability.
It should be tamper-proof.
1.5.2 Trusted Component (TC)
All the cryptographic materials (keys) of a vehicle need proper hardware
protection, namely TC. The TC stores all the cryptographic material and performs
all the cryptographic operations, [14]. The TC can also include its own clock and
battery that is periodically recharged from vehicles electric circuits.
1.5.3 Electronic Licence Plate (ELP)
These are unique ID of vehicles equivalent to the traditional license plates [16].
The advantage of ELPs is that they will automate the paper-based document
checkup of vehicles, detection of stolen cars. An alternative approach to ELP is
to use Electronic Chasis Number (ECN) [16]
1.5.4 Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI)
The large number of vehicles registered in different countries and travelling long
distances requires a robust, inter-operable and scalable key management scheme.
The involvement of legal authorities in vehicle registration indicates a certain
level of centralization. Hence the need for Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure
(VPKI) [14], where Trusted Authority (TA) will issue certified public/private key
pairs to vehicles. There will be several TAs corresponding to different regions;
they should cross certify each other. Vehicle manufactures can also take the role
of TAs.
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1.5.5 Authentication
In order to prevent in-transit traffic tampering and impersonation attacks,
authentication is needed of the origin of data packets. Currently ECC (elliptic
curve cryptography), the most compact public key cryptosystem is used due to
its less overhead. The overheads can further reduced by signing only critical
messages [14].
1.5.6 Privacy
To conceal the vehicles identity, a set of anonymous keys which will change
frequently according to different driving conditional are used. These are preloaded
into vehicles TC until the next maintenance. Each key is certified by the issuing
TA and has a short lifetime. It can be traced back to the real identity of the
vehicle in liability issues [14].
1.5.7 Secure Positioning
A vehicle can cheat with its position to escape liability cases. Hence secure
position verification is needed. In addition, vehicles or base stations may want
to verify the position of other vehicles or base stations on-the-fly to ensure they
are communication with the claimed party. Verifiable Multilateration [17] which
works by measuring the distances from three points (vehicles) to a claimant (the
vehicle whose position is being verified) are verifying that the claimed position is
consistent with the measured one.
1.6 Security Threats to VANET
Before we discuss various attacks on VANET, we must classify the capacities of
an attacker. So the attackers can be classified into four dimensions [1] which are
discussed below.
(1) Insider vs Outsider : The insider is an legitimate member of the network
that can communicate with other members. The outsider is considered as
an intruder by the network members and hence is limited in the diversity of
attacks he can mount.
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(2) Malicious vs Rational: A malicious attacker has no personal agenda for the
attacks and his only aim is to harm the member or the functionality of the
network . Hence, he may employ any means disregarding corresponding
costs and consequences. On the other hand, a rational attacker has personal
motives and hence is more predictable in terms of attack means and attack
target.
(3) Active vs Passive: An active attacker can generate packets or signals,
whereas a passive attacker contents himself with eavesdropping on the
wireless channel.
(4) Local vs ExtendedAn attacker can be limited in scope, even if controls several
entities, which makes him local. An extended attacker controls several
entities that are scattered across the network, thus extending his scope.
The security of VANET is crucial as sometimes they are related to life
threatening situations. Hence No vital information should be inserted or modified
by a malicious attacker. The system must able to determine the liability of drivers
while still maintaining their privacy.
The security attacks are broadly categorized, depending on the availability,
authentication, confidentiality, privacy, non-repudiation and data-trust [9, 10]into
the following main groups and discussed as below.
1.6.1 Threats to Availability
The following threats to the availablility of V2V and V2R have been identified.
• DoS Attack:The attacker is ∗.M.A.L category and may want to bring
down the entire VANET or even cause an accident by channel jamming
or aggressively injecting dummy messages into the network [11].
• Broadcast Tampering : An insider attacker may inject false safety messages
into the network to cause damage, such as causing an accident by suppressing
traffic warnings or manipulating the flow of traffic around a chosen route.
• Malware : A potential threat which can cause serious disruption to VANET
operations. Malwares can be introduced into the networks when the OBUs
and RSUs receive software and firmware updates.
10
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• Spamming : The increased presence of spam messages on VANET may
increase the latency.
1.6.2 Threats to Authenticity
Whenever any vehicle in VANET needs secure communication its basic
requirement is either identification or authentication of nodes under consideration.
The different types of attack on authentication are given below:
• Masquerading : By posing as a legitimate vehicle in the network, outsiders
can conduct a variety of attacks such as forming black holes or producing
false information.
• GPS Spoofing ; The attacker can produce false GPS readings by use of a
GPS satellite simulator to generate signals that are stronger than genuine
GPS satellites.
• Replay Attack : The attacker re-injects the previously received packets back
into the network, poisoning a nodes location table by replaying beacons.
• Message Tampering : An attacker may modify messages exchanged in V2V
and V2I communication in order to falsify transaction application requests
or to forge messages.
• Sybil Attack : It is the creation of multiple fake nodes broadcasting false
information [12].In this attack, a vehicle installed with an OBU sends
multiple copies of messages to other vehicles and each message contains
a different fabricated identity. The problem arises when malicious vehicle is
able to pretend as multiple vehicles and reinforce false data [13].
• ID Disclosure : This is a big brother scenario, where a global observer can
monitor the mobility pattern, trajectory of targeted vehicles and use this
location information for his benefits. To monitor, the global observer can
leverage on the fixed infrastructure or the vehicles around its target.
1.6.3 Threats to Confidentiality
Despite the fact that the messages transmitted in VANET doesn’t hold any
delicate information which ought to be kept a secret, still the secrecy of messages
11
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exchanged between the nodes of a vehicular system are especially vulnerable
to eavesdropping for collecting messages and gathering of location information
available through the transmission of broadcast messages [11].
1.6.4 Threat to Privacy
Location privacy and anonymity are important issues for vehicle users. Location
privacy involves protecting users by obscuring the users exact location in space
and time. By concealing a users request so that it is indistinguishable from other
users request, a degree of anonymity can be achieved [11].
1.7 Challenges towards security of VANET
The provision of robust security for vehicular networks must overcome a set of
technical, economic, and social challenges discussed as follows:
• Network scale and Dynamics : If realised, VANET will be the largest real-life
instance of self-organized ad hoc network, consisting of millions of nodes
which are distributed under different authorities and services providers.
Problems of scalability and seamless interoperability should be solved in a
way transparent to the driver, especially that most operations are performed
on the fly while the vehicle are moving at high speeds. Hence the vehicles
will not be able to participate in long term security protocols because of the
highly dynamic nature of the network. [4,6]
• Liability vs Privacy: One of the major concerns of VANET is accountability,
and eventually liability, of the vehicles and their drives is required. Vehicular
communication is envisioned as an excellent opportunity to obtain data that
can assist legal investigations This implies that unambiguous identification
of the vehicles should be possible, as sources of messages. But such
prerequisites raise even stronger privacy concerns [13, 14].
• Real Time Communication : The safety applications pose strict deadlines
for message delivery. This means the security protocols should impose
low processing and messaging overhead and be robust to clogging denial
of service attacks [14].
12
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• Trust: Due to the extensive number of independent nodes and the presence
of human factor, it is highly probable that misbehavior will happen.
Additionally the drivers are increasingly concerned about their privacy. Due
to lack of privacy and related potential of tracking may result in high
financial charges on the drivers (e.g. due to occasional over speeding).
Hence, the level of trust in vehicles as well as service provider base stations
will be low.
• Cost : The introduction of new communication standards, such as DSRC,
for vehicular communications will require the manufactures to install new
hardware modules on all vehicles, thus increasing the unit cost for consumers
[15].
• Gradual Deployment: IVC deployment gaining considerable market
penetration will take much time may be a decade. Hence only a small
proportion of vehicles will contain the enhanced features of IVC over the
next decade. But the functionalities should be supported despite the low
penetration rate. The vehicles should be able to carry out most of the
security functions autonomously [15].
1.8 VANET Projects Across the World
With the advent of wireless technology and underlying VANET architecture,
there are several Intelligent Transportation System [18] projects, which have been
undertaken in various countries mostly in USA, European Union and Japan. Some
of them are sponsored by automobile industries and others by government.
Early developments in VANET focused on underlying VANET architecture
such as communication standards, wireless protocol infrastructure,
standardization of 802.11p, WAVE [8] and DSRC [8] . Those are considered as
phase 1 development in VANET. But now various projects in VANET are mostly
concerned with real life implementation by field trials, called phase 2 where the
verification of protocols developed during phase 1 is also conducted. A brief
summary of various research projects is given below.
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1.8.1 In European Union
• Car-to-Car Communications Consortium (C2C-CC)(2001) [19] : The
Car2Car Consortium, a non-profit organization, sponsored by various
European automobile manufacturers that is open for research organisations,
equipment providers and other partners. Aim was to improve driving
assistance, active safety applications deployment.
• SEVECOM [20]: Secure Vehicle Communications is an EU-funded project
that focuses on providing a full definition and implementation of security
requirements for vehicular communications.
• FleetNet (2000-03) [21] : An early European Union sponsored trial, aimed
at identifying problems inherent in V2V communications.
• Network on Wheels (2004-10) [21] : An initiative by major European
manufacturers and supported by Federal Ministry of Education and
Research, Germany. Aim was to solve key technical issue of communication
protocols and security of V2V communications.
• PReVENT (2004-08) : PReVENT [21], an EU project regarding safety
applications using sensors, maps and communication system.
1.8.2 In USA
• Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)(2004) [10] : It is a set
of standards released in 2004 and again revised in 2006 [ref] , which enabled
the practical trials for V2V and V2I communications and became foundation
for other projects.
• Vehicle Safety Communications (VSC) (2002-04) (VSC-2) (2006-09) [10] :
Goal was to improve critical safety situations with the help of positioning
systems and DSRC, Evaluate the minimum safety requirement and various
performance parameters.
• Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) (2004-09) : Aim was to provide
co-ordination between different automobile manufacturers.
• Clarion [10] : Clarion A consortium of hi-tech automobile companies from
both Japan and USA.
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1.8.3 In Japan
• ASV 2 (1996-2000) [10] : stands for Advanced Safety Vehicle. It is
extended to ASV-3 in 2001 and ASV-4 in 2005 by providing automatic
collision avoidance system and navigation system. It is supported by Honda,
Mitsubishi, Suzuki and Toyota.
• DEMO started in 2000 for providing cooperative driver support system. It
uses band of 5.8 GHz and CSMA protocols for communication.
• JARI [22] stands for Japan Automobile Research Institute which conducts
many trials for the projects and it evaluated the USA projects and European
Union Projects. It mainly focuses on security and safety.
The following figure 1.4 shows the various project undertaken in different countries.
Figure 1.4: Recent Projects in European Union, USA and Japan.
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1.9 Motivation
There are so many existing research areas in VANET such as secure routing,
security, Quality of Service etc. Also researchers are working on some other
important areas like communication protocol design, cost-effective hardware
design. But out of all of these above areas, security is one of the major areas
of concern as VANETs very existence relates to life threatening conditions. Hence
it is very important that the information exchanged in VANET communication
should be authentic and cannot be inserted by a malicious attacker. While
performing the authentication, the whole system should protect the privacy of
the sender and disclose the identity of the sender only in liability issues. Now
authentication in VANET can be done with the help of Digital signatures, PKI
but it requires omnipresent fixed infrastructure (RSU) which may not be possible
due to high cost of deployment. Hence our aim is to provide authentication with
limited help of fixed infrastructure.
1.10 Objective
The main objectives of this research work is to
• Authentication for V2V Communication :Design of an Authentication
scheme for V2V communication in VANET which can operate with limited
existance of fixed infrastructure.
• Privacy :while preserving privacy, it should also be able to track the malicious
vehicle, in liability cases.
• Reduction of Communication Overhead : Group formation is done, so
that the vehicle within a group will communicate with the Group leader,
then Group Leader(GL) will aggregate and send the messages with one-hop
broadcast, also GL communicates with infrastructure, when in contact for
reporting vehicles for revocation purposes.
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1.11 Organization of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows :
1. Chapter 1 : In this chapter we have already discussed the Introduction to
VANET, Overview, Security architecture, Motivation and Objective of our
research.
2. Chapter 2 : In this chapter, Various existing schemes for authentication in
VANET such as RSU Based, Pseudonym Based, Group Based authentication
is presented along with their brief overview, features and limitations.
3. Chapter 3 : In this chapter, we present our proposed OBU based
Authentication Scheme for V2V Communication in VANET.
4. Chapter 4 : In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme.
5. Chapter 5 : Finally we conclude our research in this chapter.
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2.1 Literature Review
There are various authentication mechanisms present in VANET, but mostly they
are based on VPKI which is inefficient. Lately some group based authentication
schemes are proposed but still they couldn’t avoid the absolute necessity of RSUs.
Here we are going to discuss some of them which can be classified into the following.
2.1.1 RSU Based Authentication
The authentication of messages exchanged in VANET with the help of Digital
Signatures is efficient, but simultaneously puts the privacy of drivers/vehicles at
risk. Most RSU based authentication mechanisms use certification services and
heavily reliant on fixed continuous infrastructure. Lu, Rongxing, et al. [6] proposed
a conditional privacy preservation protocol consisting of 3 layers of privacy. First,
an RSU issues temporary anonymous certificates to vehicles, hence it can map
the vehicle with the anonymous certificate. Second, in the V2V communication,
the vehicles are anonymous to each other due to anonymous certificates. Third,
Trusted Authority (TA) can find out the identity of malicious vehicle in disputes.
The anonymous certificates have an expiration date, hence certificate revocation
can be done after the validity period. But this mechanism may not be scalable as
it depends on fixed continuous infrastructure. Due to cost constraints, it will not
be possible to provide proper infrastructure for VANET in near future.
RAISE [7] by Zhang, Chenxi, et al. also employs RSUs to assist vehicles in
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authenticating messages. In this mechanism, the messages exchanged between
vehicles are stored in temporary buffers of the receiving vehicles. They wait for
the RSU to broadcast an aggregated message compiled from all the exchanged
messages, and then compare that RSU broadcasted messages with stored messages
and use it, if they find it reliable. Although it reduced communication overhead,
still the vehicles have to wait for RSU to broadcast a aggregated message, which
may not be suitable in emergency safety messages (ESM).
2.1.2 Pseudonym Based Authentication
Message authentication and anonymity of vehicles are always two major challenges
faced by VANET. To achieve both Message authentication and privacy, Raya,
et al. [1] proposed to preload each vehicle with a large number of anonymous
public/private key pairs together with their PKI certificates. Here, for achieving
privacy, each public/private key pair has a very short life span, and a pseudo ID
is used in each public key certificate. This mechanism suffers from the limitations
of storage requirement and also dependent on PKI based architecture. It also
increases the overhead at the TA as TA has to maintain a large no of certificates
for all vehicles. The Above limitation are dealt by the mechanisms proposed by
Calandriello et al. [2] and Lin et al. [3] where group signatures [4] are used to
permit vehicles to generate self-certified public keys.
2.1.3 Group Based Authentication
Group Based protocols are mainly used for privacy preservation. The key is to
hid the vehicles identity in a group. Group signature [4] allows a group member
to sign messages anonymously on behalf of a group. The identity of a signer can
only be revealed by group manager in case of disputes. Lin et al [4] proposed
a group signature based scheme to sign the messages. Here, the recipients can
verify the messages authenticity using the group public key. If authenticated,
then then the vehicle confirms that the message has originated from a legitimate
vehicle of the network, not some malicious vehicle. But the recipient vehicle
cannot determine the source vehicles identity due to group signature. Hence
it helped in authentication, privacy preservation, reduced storage and also low
bandwidth consumption. Lin et al. also proposed a geographic based group
formation. Calandriello et al . [2] proposed a scheme where a vehicle can generate
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public/private key pairs by itself using a group key. It achieved a tradeoff between
traditional PKI based Schemes and group-signature-based schemes. Though,
group signature is a stronger property than pseudonym authentication, it still has
many complexities as Group formation in VANET is highly volatile and frequently
changes.
Verma, et al. [5] proposed SeGCom which is a combination of both RSU
based and Group based authentication. Here group refers to the vehicles under
the coverage area of same RSUs. SeGCom provides 2 types of authentication
mechanisms. First, successive authentication mechanisms for V2I communication,
where the vehicle is authenticated by RSUs. Second, group formation and
group Key distribution for V2V communication which is done with the help of
corresponding RSU, Here no group leader is present. The RSU distributes a split
key to vehicles for V2V communication upon the entrance of the vehicle to its
coverage area. Then the vehicle can self-compute different split keys inside the
coverage area of RSU, until it leaves the current group.
2.2 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed briefly about various authentication schemes in
VANET which are primarily dependent on fixed infrastructure and TA. But due
to high cost of deployment and communication overhead issues, they are not
always efficient. Our proposed On Board Unit Based authentication scheme which
primarily focuses on V2V communication can operate with lack of infrastructure
due to its self-sustaining nature. Hence it drastically reduces cost of deployment.
Also Group communication between members and Group leader reduces network
overhead.
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3.1 Network Model
In our proposed scheme, we only consider V2V communication for mostly for safety
related information as traffic optimization messages are mostly broadcasted by
RSUs via V2I communication. The vehicle form dynamic non-overlapping groups
depending upon their driving pattern and closeness. Each vehicle is equipped with
Global positioning Systems (GPS) , Trusted Component(TC) and OBUs which are
capable of short lived anonymous public/private key pairs. The newly generated
key pairs are self-certified, hence doesn’t depend on any fixed infrastructures for
key certification. The keys can be authenticated by the receiver (group leader in
this case) and can be revoked later.
3.2 Assumptions
The proposed scheme is based on following assumptions
• A straight road scenario such as Highways, Hence group formation would
be easier by their mobility pattern as most of the vehicles travel in same
direction and there is little chance of changing direction.
• The Group leader can be elected as the vehicle at the center of the vehicle
cluster.
• Each vehicle is equipped with GPS, TC etc.
• Whenever the OBU sends a message, it automatically attaches a tracking
hint which is provided by TA. It will later help in identifying malicious
vehicles.
• Key revocation can be done by the TA using the existing Revocation of
Trusted Component (RTC) protocol [16] by mapping the tracking hint with
the vehicle unique ID registered.
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3.3 Notation
The Notations used in this scheme are given in Table below and we have adopted
some of the notations from [23]
• G = (G,*). A Finite Cyclic group of order q , g ǫ G is a generator of G,
assuming it is impossible to compute discrete logarithms in G with respect
to g. G might be a large multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p for some large prime
p, where q is a large prime dividing p− 1.
• h Cryptographic one way hash function mapping arbitrary length binary
string to fixed length strings of length l (typical value of l is 512 for SHA-512)
• f Another Cryptographic one way hash function mapping the set {0, 1, ..q−
1} onto itself.
• m ≥ 1, Positive integer determining number of key pairs that a vehicle can
generate.
Table 3.1: Notations
Notation Description
skTA TA’s master secret Key
PKTA TA’s public keys
VID The vehicle
OBUV The OBU equipped on the vehicle V
TCV The Trusted Component on the vehicle V
σ Tracking Hint
cv Check Value
PKi Public key at time Ti
SKi Corresponding Private Key at time Ti
Hi Corresponding Helper Value for PKi
Gjreq Group Joining Req
Pu/Pvt Short lived public/pvivate key pair of vehicle V
certOBU OBU certification on Pu and Hi
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3.4 Generation of Check Value
1. TA chooses skTA ǫ Z
∗
p [The Master Secret]
2. Generated corresponding public key
PKTA = g
skTA (3.1)
3. OBUV submits its VID to TA during registration. TA chooses another
random number Sǫ(G, ∗) for the OBUV and generates a +ve integer P such
that
P = πmj=0f
j (S) (3.2)
4. Check Value cv is calculated as
cv = h(gP ) (3.3)
5. Tracking hint
σ = EncrPKTA(VID) (3.4)
3.5 Generation of Anonymous public/private
Key pairs
• TA gives the following to TCV
{certTA(cv) , σ ,S , Tspan}
• Tspan is life time for the check value cv until the next maintenance, where
as Ti is a short time interval, within which the vehicle should not be able to
generate enough different keys to make a false information reliable for the
receiving vehicle.
• In each time interval Ti, TCv generates anonymous public/private key pair
as follows
– Private Key
SKi = π
m−i−1
j=0 f
j (S) (3.5)
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– Public Key
PKi = g
SKi (3.6)
– Helper value for public key pki
Hi = π
m
j=m−if
j (S) (3.7)
• if V wants to join a group, the OBUv generates a key pair pu/pvt
(preferable by RSA) and corresponding certificate certOBU is signed using
SKi, generated in equation 3.5. The certOBU also contains cv and pu and
valid for only time period Ti.
• OBUV sends the following parameters to Group Leader (GL)along with
Gjreq message.
{certOBU , PKi, Hi, σ }
3.6 Authentication
• The GL calculates
cv∗ = PKHii
• if cv == h(cv∗)
then vehicle V (OBUV ) is authenticated and GL stores the corresponding
pu and cv
• GL sends to OBUV his group public key for further communication.
Encrpu(PKgl||{PKgl}sigPKgl)
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, an authentication scheme which can operate with limited support
of fixed infrastructure was presented. Here, the vehicles generate self-certified
anonymous public/private key pairs based on a check value given by TA, hence
it eliminates the necessity of TA to store all the key pairs as well as frequent
communication with TA for authentication purpose. While the proposed scheme
preserves the privacy of vehicles, it can also track a vehicle using tis tracking hint.
But other vehicles can’t track a vehicle even if they have the tracking hint as they
don’t have the master secret of TA. Group formation is done only to reduce the
network overhead by reducing no of broadcasts by all the members.
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4.1 Authentication by Group Leader
• The Group Leader GL calculates cv
∗ as
cv∗ = PKHii
by equation 3.6
cv∗ = gSKiHi
by equation 3.5 and 3.7
cv∗= gpi
m−i−1
j=0 f
j(S)pimj=m−if
j(S)
which reduces to
cv∗ = gpi
m
j=0f
j(S)
Hence by equation 3.2
cv∗ = gP
But from equation 3.3
cv = h(gP )
cv = h(cv∗)
Hence the vehicle is authenticated by group leader.
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4.2 Privacy
In Our Proposed authentication scheme, the TA gives a common check value cv
to all the registered vehicles. And the authentication is also achieved using the
check value. So if an adversary or a member of group itself tries to track a specific
vehicle using its check value cv, it will not succeed in its attempt as all the vehicles
are having same check value cv. ’
But in liability cases, the Group Leader can submit the tracking hint σ of
the sender vehicle to TA, when comes in contact with fixed infrastructure, from
equation 3.4
σ = EncrPKTA(VID)
Hence it can only be decrypted by TA using his master secret skTA. No other
vehicle can decode the tracking hint. Then TA may revoke the certificate of the
vehicle using any of the existing Certificate revocation protocols [ref] such as RTC.
4.3 Group joining and leaving
As already discussed, a vehicle can become member of a group (having same
mobility pattern) by sending Gjreq and subsequent authentication by Group
Leader. If a vehicle leaves the group, the Group Leader doesn’t have to change
anything in its key, but if the Group Leader itself leaves the group, in which case
the remaining members must elect a new group leader (usually the vehicle at the
center of the cluster). By group formation the communication overhead is reduced
significantly which can be shown by the following scenario..
Consider a scenario when there are 10 vehicles in a group. All vehicles will
send messages to each other (mesh topology), which will result in 45 messages
transmissions within group. But if there is group leader and the vehicles (in
this case 9) only send their messages to Group Leader and then the group leader
aggregate and send one aggregated message, the same information sharing can be
achieved using 10 message transmissions. (9 unicast+ 1 broadcast)
Hence group formation definitely helps in reducing network overhead.
(Although group formation in VANET is not yet very clear)
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4.4 Summary
In this Chapter, the authentication procedure by Group leader is shown. Then
how our proposed scheme protects the privacy of vehicles, is explained. Lastly a
comparison table of various existing authentication schemes is given. Although
the performance of our proposed scheme may not be very effective, but the major
advantage is the drastically reduced cost. It can operated with limited support
of fixed infrastructure, hence can readily deployed, while other schemes may have
to wait until omnipresent fixed infrastructure is deployed. The following table 4.1
shows a comparison of various schemes which summarizes everything.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Characteristics of Various schemes discussed in literature and our proposed scheme
Features Raya et al. [1] Calandriello et al. [2] SegCom [5] Our Solution
Additional Hardware
Needed
yes yes yes yes
Provide Authenticity of
messages
yes yes yes yes
Anonymity of msg origin no yes no yes
Cost of infrastructure High High High Low
RSU needed must must must can operate with limited support
provide distinguishable
emitters
no no yes yes
no of key pairs to be stored All that must be used 1 All NONE
no of key pairs to be
managed by TA
ALL 1 All NONE
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Conclusion and Future Work
In our work, we proposed an On Board Unit Based Authentication for V2V
Communication in VANET which can operate effectively with limited support
of fixed infrastructure when there is a lack of it. Our proposed Scheme also forms
groups between vehicle based on their mobility pattern to share traffic related
information. The group leader receives and authenticates the messages from the
vehicles and then sends the aggregated information into the network which reduces
network overheads. By this scheme, the privacy of vehicles is also protected. But
most importantly, it drastically reduces the overhead on TA as neither the TA have
to store all the key pairs for revocation purpose nor the TA have to authenticate
each vehicle. Also less dependency on fixed infrastructure results in reduced cost,
as the infrastructure needed for VANET will take a lot of time in coming days to
be fully implemented, till then our scheme can be an effective way to authenticate
vehicles.
Scope for Further Research
Although our work only deals with Authentication of message, there is considerable
concern regarding reliability of messages and subsequent evaluation for revocation.
So this work can be further extended for checking reliability of messages as well
as design of parameters for an efficient certificate revocation procedure.
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